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Abstract In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the
status of early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on
presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental
capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on
a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which uses the
decision theory model of moral reasoning, promises to reconcile the uncertainty
about the ontological status of embryos with the certainty about normative obli-
gations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-life view, although
seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used
to limit destructive research on human embryos.
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Introduction
Human embryos in the early stages of development are ontologically ambiguous
entities.1 This ontological ambiguity of early embryos, which has been discussed by
some philosophers and bioethicists [1, 2], although not recognized by the majority
of pro-life followers, is an underlying reason for the uncertainty about the moral
status of human embryos. What is the morally permitted way of acting in the face of
uncertainty about the moral status of some beings? Does this uncertainty ‘‘cast
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serious doubt on the arguments claiming… full protection’’ [3, p. 153] of embryos,
or is it the other way around: does it give a reason for acting in a cautious way and
treating these entities as if they had very high or even full moral status? In this
article, I will argue that the uncertainty about the moral status of the entity we are
dealing with sometimes, indeed, gives us a reason to act in a precautionary way.
Nevertheless, it cannot be a reason for granting unconditional full protection to
embryos, which could result, for example, in banning research on human embryos
or in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures.
The standard interpretations of the pro-life views
The dominant view in recent Western moral sensibility is that human embryos have
a special status, but not as high as that of children or adults. This means that the
embryos’ right to life (especially in the early stages of development) can be weighed
against some individual or societal benefits in a way that the right to life of children
or adults cannot be. This view is present in many societal practices (e.g., the
acceptance of ‘‘morning-after pills’’ that destroy early embryos, not caring about
massive early embryo loss, etc.) as well as in the legal regulations of many
European states where destructive research on early human embryos is legally
permitted if it serves important scientific purposes. In most European states research
is permitted only on embryos that are no longer needed for reproduction, but in
some, permission is extended to embryos created specifically for research (e.g.,
Belgium, Sweden, the UK) [4]. Even in those states where embryo protection seems
to be much more intense and embryo research is prohibited (e.g., Austria, Ireland,
Poland), embryos are not treated by the law as having full moral status or a full right
to life from the very beginning (e.g., the law in these countries accepts the sacrifice
of embryos during IVF procedures for individual reproductive purposes). The view
that ascribes gradual moral status to embryos also has a strong historical background
within the Catholic tradition, at least up until the end of the 19th century [5].
Some opponents of destructive embryonic research claim that every human
embryo should be treated as having full moral status and a full right to life. If this is
correct, the justification for destructive embryonic research should be similar to the
justification that permits killing a human adult. But there is full agreement in
medical ethics that it is morally wrong (and that it should not be legally permitted)
to intentionally kill an adult human being in order to pursue medical research (as
well as for any reason other than self-defense). Moreover, for the supporters of pro-
life views, destructive embryo research or IVF should be morally worse than some
cases of abortion (e.g., those performed because of self-defense reasons), as these
procedures result in the deliberate creation of embryos that are either destroyed for
experiments or abandoned for reproductive purposes.
How should one understand the pro-life view, which claims that the moral status
of embryos and adult human beings are equal? The most influential justification is
the theological argument given by current Catholic doctrine. The recent instruction
Dignitas Personae published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in
2008 claims that ‘‘the human embryo has…, from the very beginning, the dignity
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proper to a person’’ [6]. The same position can be found in many earlier documents
of the Catholic Church (e.g., in Donum Vitae published in 1987: ‘‘the fruit of human
generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the
zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the
human being in his bodily and spiritual totality’’ [7]; a very similar claim may be
found in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae published in 1995 [8, section 60]). ‘‘The
very beginning’’ or ‘‘the first moment’’ is commonly understood as the moment of
fertilization (or an equivalent process, e.g., nuclear transfer). What does it mean to
have ‘‘the dignity proper to a person’’? The Catholic Church adopts a standard
definition of a person proposed by Boethius: ‘‘an individual substance of a rational
nature’’ (naturae rationalis individua substantia). One contemporary Thomist
interprets this formula as follows: ‘‘a person must consist of one, ongoing ontology
and a soul which endows it with the powers of rationality, i.e., intellect’’ [9, p. 140].
These three requirements (unicity, ontological continuity, and an intellectual soul)
are necessary requirements for a being to have the status of a person.
The theological justification is important, since it is intertwined with philosoph-
ical justifications of the pro-life view (see, e.g., [10–12]). Even if some of these
philosophical justifications do not appeal to theologically loaded concepts, like
those of ‘‘soul’’ or ‘‘person,’’ they share with the theological justifications a
commitment to substance ontology, which is the claim that ‘‘human’’ is ‘‘a
substance concept’’ and an entity becomes a human substance in one discrete event
[13]. This kind of approach says that human beings have some substantial properties
(as opposed to accidental) that indicate what kind of beings they are. Although this
position by itself does not justify the ascription of moral status (one might accept a
‘‘substance ontology’’ and yet think that moral status is a human projection), it is
commonly used by philosophers defending the pro-life view. Substance ontology
seeks to determine either the exact moment when a human being comes into
existence or the process in which it emerges: before and after this there are two
different entities. Moreover, each being must also be distinct from all other entities:
e.g., when a human embryo splits to form identical twins, substance ontology would
claim that either one being ceased to exist and that two new beings appeared in its
place or that an original being survives the twinning, but a second individual
emerges alongside it. Some philosophers claim that advances in biology can help to
identify the moment (e.g., of the fusion of the nuclei) when a human being begins.
In the opinion of those who defend the pro-life view, the process of fertilization (or
some moment during it) marks when a new substance comes into being (although
they can disagree whether it happens during the fusion of the sperm and egg, the
fusion of the nuclei, or the first cell division). In the case of cloning, the joining of
the nucleus and the enucleated egg marks this moment and therefore cloned
embryos ought to be treated as having the same moral status as other human
embryos [14, p. 4]. There is also an additional pragmatic reason for treating
fertilization as the moment of substantial change: since embryonic development
occurs along a continuum, it is impossible to make any convincing distinction at any
other point in this process (this argument is also visible in the Declaration on
Procured Abortion published in 1974: ‘‘It [a new human being] would never be
made human if it were not human already’’ [15]). Therefore, we should accord
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human embryos full moral status from the moment an oocyte is fertilized or nuclear
transfer takes place.
Proponents of the pro-life view who justify their views either on theological or
philosophical grounds assume that the essential qualities of the intellectual soul or
the human organism do not have to be actualized for a person to be present, since
human embryos are organisms that, from the very beginning, have potentiality to
develop into an adult human being. They adopt so-called active potentiality: the
actualization of potentiality arises from the nature of the entity itself, without
dependence on external causes. The distinction between active and passive
potentiality helps to explain why a human embryo has full moral status but human
gametes do not (they have only passive potentiality). There are also other reasons
why the notion of potentiality is important: the cells in a human being do not differ
in the genetic information they contain but only in the subset of the genes they
express. One could ask, why do most proponents of the pro-life view not ascribe full
moral status to any single human cell except the one-celled embryo? The answer
could be that the fertilized egg is unique because, unlike somatic cells, it possesses
an active potentiality to develop into an organism using its own genetic information
[10, p. 53]. Therefore, the strict ontology and the concept of active potentiality help
to maintain that it is wrong to kill an embryo, since ‘‘she is identical to an entity
that, at some time later in her development, everyone agrees it is wrong to kill’’ [11,
p. 249].
Some problems with the standard interpretations
A well-known reason for the uncertainty about the moral status of early human
embryos is the ambiguity concerning their ontological status, especially their
capacity for splitting and recombination. Early embryos can be teased into two or
more parts, each of which can develop into a fetus. Conversely, two different
embryos may fuse and develop into one fetus and then an adult human being with
cells containing two different DNAs, which sometimes happens naturally and often
results in genetic disorders, but many human chimeras are completely healthy and
unaware of their genetic condition. This is one reason why even some Catholic
scholars claim that early human embryos cannot have souls until after the second
week of fertilization, when the primitive streak begins to form. The proponents of
‘‘delayed animation’’ underline the fact that the moment of ensoulment must
coincide with the formation of an ontological individual [16, 17]. The capacity for
splitting and recombination and the possible lack of ontological continuity is also a
reason why some philosophers who defend a pro-life view on abortion do not
ascribe full moral status to early embryos [18].
The second reason for the uncertainty about the moral status of early human
embryos is related to the high rate of their ‘‘mortality’’: about 50–80 % of embryos
naturally die within the first few hours or days after conception. Thus, the
proponents of the pro-life view are vulnerable to the critique that they do not in fact
ascribe as high a moral status to embryos as they verbally claim. If they in fact think
that embryos have full moral status, why do they not care about the more than 200
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million ‘‘young and innocent’’ beings dying every year after a very short life? Why
do they not call for global research programs that could improve the embryos’
survival rate? A philosopher who has recently discussed this problem writes that
‘‘finding means of saving even 5 % of embryos from spontaneous abortion would
save more lives than a cure for cancer’’ [19, p. 15]. It seems that everybody,
including hardline pro-life thinkers, accept that procreation involves the (inten-
tional) creation and (non-intentional, but easy to foresee) destruction of many
embryos no matter if the fertilization occurs in vitro or in vivo: ‘‘a mother of three
children could be expected to have also had approximately five spontaneous
abortions’’ [19, p. 13]. It is extremely hard to justify that creating some entities and
then letting them die at a very young age is permissible as part of a procreative
project if these entities indeed had a moral status equal to that of an adult human
being. This is why one Thomist scholar recently came to the conclusion that: ‘‘it
seems odd to believe that God … would permit the needless death of so many
persons. It seems more reasonable to conceive of them as naturally rejected
biological material—not persons’’ [9, p. 156].
Thirdly, assuming the existence of a rational ‘‘soul’’ from the very moment of
conception (and thereby the beginning of personhood) plays a much less important
role within the Catholic tradition than is commonly thought [20]. The official
teaching of the Catholic Church on prenatal life explicitly recognizes this
philosophical uncertainty about the beginning of ensoulment, which makes many
pro-lifers holier than the Pope. For example, in the Declaration on Procured
Abortion, the Congregation states, ‘‘this declaration expressly leaves aside the
question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous
tradition on this point and authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates from
the first instant; for others it could not at least precede nidation’’ [15].
This position is sustained in all official documents. For example, in 1987 in
Donum Vitae, the Congregation, on the one hand, wrote that ‘‘the conclusions of
science regarding the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by
the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of this first appearance of a
human life,’’ but on the other hand, it does not confirm explicitly that embryos are
persons: ‘‘The Magisterium has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a
philosophical nature’’ (that is, whether early embryos have souls) [7]. This position
was repeated by John Paul II in 1995 in Evangelium Vitae [8, sec. 60], and in 2008
by the Congregation in Dignitas Personae, which interprets this view explicitly:
‘‘Donum Vitae, in order to avoid a statement of an explicitly philosophical nature,
did not define the embryo as a person’’ [6]. Some commentators argue that this last
fragment ‘‘pull[s] back from a growing trajectory in the Church’s teaching, from
debates over ensoulment to the benefit-of-the-doubt approach taken by the CDF [the
Congregation] in its 1974 Declaration on Procured Abortion and the more robust
(albeit interrogative) defense of the personhood of the embryo during the pontificate
of John Paul II’’ [21, p. 314], but it seems that the constant avoiding of the definition
of an embryo as a person by the Congregation or the successive popes is clear
evidence that there is no substantial shift of views between 1974 and 2008.
Why does the Congregation claim, on the one hand, that human embryos ‘‘have
dignity proper to a person’’ and should be treated as persons from the very moment
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of conception, but on the other hand, does not support ‘‘conceptionism’’ explicitly
(i.e., the view that ensoulment takes place during conception)? How is it possible to
combine certainty about normative obligations with uncertainty about ontological
status, as is expressed, for example, in this fragment of the Declaration on Procured
Abortion: ‘‘From a moral point of view this is certain: even if a doubt existed
concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is
objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder’’ [15]?
The standard interpretation claims that the argument from active potentiality
must again appear on the stage: even if we are not sure whether an early embryo has
a soul, we are certain that it is ‘‘a human life, preparing for and calling for a soul’’
[15] (in other Church documents an early embryo is also called: ‘‘a human being’’)
and thus it possesses capabilities that will be exercised later, but which make it a
person now. What does it mean that an embryo is ‘‘a human life’’ or ‘‘a human
being’’? The simplest answer is that it is an organism that contains the human
genome. Does it mean that the uncertainty about the moment of ensoulment does
not have to coincide with uncertainty about the existence of human life?
Theoretically, it is possible to be certain that some organism is ‘‘a human life,’’
but at the same time to be uncertain whether it has a rational soul, since this would
only ‘‘prepare for’’ it and ‘‘call for’’ it. But this would not be a proper interpretation
of the Catholic view. According to the Thomistic metaphysics adopted by the recent
Catholic documents, all human beings are persons, and it is not possible to have the
ontological status of a human life without an intellectual soul which must inform the
matter of each human being [22]. Therefore, the standard interpretation does not
explain the rigid stance of pro-lifers against human embryo research in the face of
uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos which is recognized even within
the Catholic doctrine.
The argument from normative uncertainty (ANU)
I will argue that in the case of early embryos there exists a strong pro-life argument
based on the criteria of rational action under uncertainty that can easily explain the
rigid stance of pro-lifers against human embryo research even in the face of their
uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos. It is strong because (1) it does
not require the acceptance of Thomistic metaphysics or any other substance
ontology, (2) it avoids the unsolvable discussion about the moment of ‘ensoulment’
or about the beginning of personhood, (3) it does not depend on claims about the
ontological status of embryos and their identity through time with the human beings
they precede, and (4) it is able to bypass the notorious problem of potentiality.
The case of early embryos I discuss here is a manifestation of the broader
problem of our moral fallibility and meta-reasoning in making moral decisions [23–
25]. So, this discussion may have interesting applications to other cases of
normative uncertainty because even when we feel quite certain about moral issues,
we are susceptible to moral mistakes, and we need to have a method to deal with the
possibility that we will get some crucial moral issues wrong. For example, we have
to act very often in the face of uncertainty about moral doctrines, specific moral
446 T. _Zuradzki
123
duties, or the ontological status of some entities. In this last case, we may have our
doubts because (1) we may be unsure when they begin to belong to some
ontological class, or (2) they are difficult to classify, or, last but not least, (3) our
ontological classifications themselves are vague. The problem is of crucial
importance for ethics, since belonging to some ontological class usually has serious
implications for moral status. Except for human embryos at the early stages of
development, real-life examples of entities with uncertain ontological—and thus
moral—status include some products (real or only possible) of genetic engineering:
the ‘‘embryo-like’’ products of therapeutic cloning or parthenogenesis, blastomeres
that can be changed in laboratory conditions into totipotent stem cells, and induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPS). Some philosophers have also argued that the
uncertainty about the status of animals provides a reason for acting cautiously
and treating them as if they had very high moral status. Peter Singer used this type
of reasoning to defend vegetarianism. He considered an example of someone who is
uncertain whether killing a pig in order to eat it is right or wrong. Singer claims that
usually there are no pressing moral reasons for killing animals: the fact that one
might prefer a dish containing meat to a vegetarian meal is hardly a matter of great
moral significance for anyone. Therefore, even if we do not accept that animals have
important moral status ‘‘it would seem better to give the pig the benefit of the
doubt’’ [26, p. 252] (cf. [27]).
The argument from normative uncertainty is visible in the Congregation
documents: ‘‘it suffices that this presence of the soul be probable (and one can never
prove the contrary) in order that the taking of life involve accepting the risk of
killing a man, not only waiting for, but already in possession of his soul’’ [6, fn. 19]
(cf. [7]). The structure of this argument is as follows: (1) we have to act in the face
of uncertainty about the moral status of some entity (E)—either because we are not
sure when it begins, or because we are not sure if it belongs to some ontological
class, or because we are not sure which moral doctrine is the right one; (2) even if
there are some reasons (r) to destroy E, they are not decisive; (3) if E belongs to this
ontological class (or if E starts to exist at a particular moment of time or some moral
doctrine is the right one), the moral status of E is full, i.e., equal to the status of an
adult human being; (4) if the entity has full moral status, it is seriously wrong to
destroy it and r does not justify it, whereas if it does not have such a high status we
can destroy it without committing anything that is morally wrong; (5) rationality
and morality require that we should act as if E had full moral status even if we do
not believe that it has full moral status (I have discussed a similar argument in
Polish in [28]).
The argument presupposes a form of moral fallibilism: one can never be certain
that a given view on ontological or moral questions is correct or true. No matter how
strong someone’s views are about the ontological status of embryos, it is always
possible (‘‘one can never prove the contrary’’) that in fact early embryos have an
ontological status such that we should treat them because of moral reasons as equal
to adult human beings. If there is only a probability, no matter how small, that
embryos have this kind of status, we should act as if they had souls indeed (‘‘mere
probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely
clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo’’). Why does
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the exact probability not matter? The ANU makes use of the decision theory model
of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty, that is, in situations where
we are not sure, for example, what the ontological status of the embryo is and what
its moral implications are. Usually, in cases of factual risk or uncertain
consequences, to determine which course of action we should pursue, the decision
theory model of reasoning recommends taking the subjective probabilities of
various outcomes and combining them with the values we attach to the outcomes.
The ANU appeals to analogical reasoning in the face of normative uncertainty: we
should evaluate the subjective probabilities of different doctrines about the moral
status of early human embryos and combine them with the disvalues attached by
these doctrines to the destruction of embryos. If the disvalue attached by some
doctrine to the intentional destruction of an embryo is substantial (or even infinite, if
we give an absolutist interpretation to doctrines that strictly prohibit intentionally
killing a person or something of similar status) this parameter dominates the
calculus. The probability that embryos have full moral status could be minimal (or,
in other words, the doctrine assuming that embryos have full moral status could be
extremely unreliable, though not false), but the disvalue of the risk of intentionally
destroying a being with full moral status will prevail, because in the moment of
decision, we do not know whether it indeed has this kind of status or not. This
reasoning has an important implication: when we act under normative uncertainty,
we should not always act according to the normative view that in our opinion is
most reliable. In the case of embryo research, the ANU does not claim that anyone
should believe that early embryos have full moral status from the very beginning or
the ontological status of persons. Even if we strongly believe (but we cannot be
sure) that it is permissible to destroy human embryos until the 14th day after
conception in order to conduct important scientific research, it is rational and moral
to act in a precautionary manner: any rational and moral agent should act as if early
embryos had full moral status (or as if they were persons, as if they had souls, etc.)
This emphasis on pragmatic reasons (on the question ‘‘What should we do under
normative uncertainty?’’ and not ‘‘What should we believe under normative
uncertainty?’’) distinguishes this argument from Pascal’s wager (although, strictly
speaking, Pascal did not maintain that it is rational to believe in God, but rather, that
it is rational to resolve on believing in God).
It may seem that the ANU follows the traditional approach of Catholic moral
theology developed in the 16th and the 17th centuries for resolving doubts [5]. This
tradition makes a distinction between a doubt of fact and a doubt of law. In this first
case, a decision maker is uncertain whether some particular act will or will not fulfill
the law. In the second case a decision-maker is uncertain whether some particular
moral rule is in effect (this approach models moral duties according to the natural
law tradition: moral duties depend on objectively existing rules imposed by God and
usually can be known by reason). The difference between these two approaches is
crucial because Catholic moral theology used to claim that in the case of a doubt of
fact always the safer course of action must be followed: we are not allowed to act if
there is a probability that an innocent person will be killed or harmed. Whereas in
the case of a doubt of law a decision-maker does not need certainty to act, even if
human life is at risk. The dominant procedure is probabilism, which claims that a
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decision-maker is allowed not to follow a rule if there exists a probable opinion in
favour of liberty (that is, that a particular moral rule does not have to be obeyed),
even though the contrary opinion is more probable. Two other decision procedures
on how to act in the case of a doubt of law are: equiprobabilism which claims that
one is allowed to follow the opinion in favour of liberty only in cases when
conflicting opinions are nearly equally probable; and probabiliorism which says that
a decision maker may do it only when opinions in favour of liberty are more
probable. Two factors were relevant to measure whether an opinion is more
probable than another: the number of Church fathers supporting some opinion and
their authority. Carol A. Tauer gives two examples in which probabilistic methods
were accepted by the Church in the past: the castration of boys for religious choirs
and the acceptance of slavery. In both cases the existence of conflicting opinions
about the permissibility of these practices was taken as an argument in favor of
liberty [5, p. 25].
It is easy to notice that the ANU used in the recent Catholic documents treats
uncertainty about the ontological status of early embryos and the moment of
ensoulment differently: as a doubt of fact, not as a doubt of law. On the one hand
this is problematic in the light of the Congregation’s own statement that ‘‘it is not up
to the biological sciences to make a definitive judgment on questions which are
properly philosophical and moral such as the moment when a human person is
constituted.’’ So treating the question about the moment of ensoulment as a doubt of
fact by the Congregation requires adopting quite an unusual understanding of the
term ‘‘fact’’ that would include theological facts (e.g., ‘‘embryos have souls’’). On
the other hand, in the case of early embryos, there is not ‘‘a doubt of law,’’ because
the moral rule expressed by the reliable authority (the Congregation) is clear: early
embryos should be treated as persons. Tauer argues that this is a third category of
doubt—theoretical doubt that is equivalent to a doubt of law and thus should be
handled according to probabilistic methods. In the final section, I will show why
these probabilistic methods are not always the proper approach and I will point out
more fundamental problems with the ANU-type of reasoning.
The ANU in bioethical discussions
The ANU as an argument in favor of the pro-life view on the moral status of early
embryos and its potential applications has been overlooked by many contemporary
bioethicists, and the ontological ambiguity of early embryos (though not of the
fetuses) is not widely recognized within the pro-life camp. Moreover, the ANU type
of reasoning has also been recently applied to some embryo-like products of genetic
engineering. In Dignitas Personae the Congregation claims that we should treat the
products of human parthenogenesis, altered nuclear transfer, and oocyte assisted
reprogramming (if someone were to carry out these procedures on human material)
as human persons because there are:
… questions of both a scientific and an ethical nature regarding above all the
ontological status of the ‘‘product’’ obtained in this way. Until these doubts
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have been clarified, the statement of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae needs to
be kept in mind: ‘‘what is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of
moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is involved would
suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at
killing a human embryo.’’ [6]
This formulation suggests that the prohibition can be extended to other ‘‘embryo-
like products’’ that are not enumerated explicitly in this document, even if there ‘‘is
the mere probability that a human person is involved.’’ This means that the ANU
could prohibit any procedure that leads to obtaining totipotent cells (which can
become an embryo under the proper conditions). For example, it could be extended
to the early-stage blastomeres extracted from an embryo that might also be
totipotent and, at least in theory, capable of developing into a second embryo.
Some philosophers have recently discussed a similar type of reasoning in the
context of abortion [23, 29–31]. In one article by two eminent philosophers, Frank
Jackson and Michael Smith, the authors claim that there is a group of Catholics
who:
… oppose early stage abortion while granting that it is far from certain that an
early stage foetus is a person. They argue that it is possible that early stage
abortion is not the intentional killing of an innocent person because it is not
the killing of a person, and, therefore, that it may not be ruled out by absolutist
prohibitions against the intentional killing of innocent persons. But, all the
same, early stage abortion ought not to be allowed because we cannot be
sufficiently confident that the early stage foetus is not a person. Their position
is, precisely, that early stage abortion may or may not be something that is
objectively wrong but it is certainly something that decision-ought not to be
done. [30, pp. 270–271]2
Their claim seems to be mistaken in the light of recent theological or doctrinal
discussions by Catholics regarding the permissibility of early stage abortion.
Admittedly, the Congregation claims that this kind of uncertainty about the
personhood of early embryos exists, and that some scholars or theologians claim
that the intellectual soul cannot be incarnated before the implantation process
(Congregation calls it ‘‘nidation’’). But as I have noted, today’s supporters of
delayed animation (e.g., Ford [16]) claim that an embryo is animated just after the
implantation (but not much later). Today, no Catholic maintains, as Thomas
Aquinas did and as many others did until the 19th century, that a fetus is animated
by an intellectual soul 40 days after conception (in the case of a male fetus) and
90 days (in the case of a female fetus). Since abortions are performed after
implantation, the ANU type argument discussed by Jackson and Smith cannot be
applied today by any ‘‘group of Catholics’’ to abortion (if there are Catholics who do
not oppose early abortion, they probably have other justifications). This is the main
reason why I concentrate not on the problem of abortion, but on the permissibility of
acts that lead to the destruction of early embryos, and above all on research on
2 Jackson and Smith distinguish ‘‘decision-ought’’ from ‘‘objective-ought’’: the first takes into
consideration the epistemic state of an agent.
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human embryonic stem cells (since they are harvested from blastocysts 4–5 days
after fertilization) and other moral issues concerning early embryos (e.g., the fate of
spare embryos after in vitro fertilization, ‘‘morning-after’’ pills, or even some
contraceptives).
In this context, it is surprising that no one (as far as I know) has analyzed the
ANU type argument in detail in the context of the permissibility of embryo research.
A few bioethicists or philosophers have noticed the possibility that the pro-life view
on embryo research can be interpreted this way, but their analyses are often
oversimplified.
For example, David Martin Shaw, who discusses a version of the ANU in two
short paragraphs (he calls it ‘‘the argument from doubt’’) of his paper about embryo
research correctly, notices that the argument is often presented as an analogy: ‘‘if I
am hunting with a rifle, and I see something move in the trees but am unsure
whether it is a deer or a person, I am obliged not to shoot until I establish that it is in
fact a deer: better safe than sorry’’ [32, p. 219]. He is right that this is the traditional
way of describing the problem of factual doubts by Catholic moral theologians, but
he is mistaken in other respects. He says, firstly (and mistakenly, in my opinion),
that the main problem with this argument is that it conflates empirical ignorance
with conceptual uncertainty (he borrows the terms from Alex Mauron): we can
resolve empirically whether or not the target is a person, but we cannot settle in the
same way the issue of the ontological and moral status of embryos. This is certainly
true, but it seems that the possibility and the method of resolving the uncertainty
does not explain fully the difference between empirical ignorance and conceptual
uncertainty: the correctness of a decision procedure under uncertainty (or ignorance)
does not depend on whether it is possible to check the accuracy of this decision
afterwards. For example, the correctness of the hunter’s decision to shoot or not
depends on his evidence at the moment of shooting, not on the future possibility of
checking whether the moving entity in the trees was a deer or a person (this problem
is related to the discussions about objective and subjective—or ‘‘decision’’—oughts;
see, e.g., [30, pp. 268–271]). Secondly, Shaw says that the hunter should not shoot
until he is sure that the target is not a person. Strictly speaking, the hunter will never
have this kind of certainty at the moment of shooting; for example, he cannot rule
out that some rival has not added hallucinogenic drugs to his morning coffee.
Normally, we are allowed to proceed in these types of cases only if the risk of
killing a person is negligible.
Kevin Elliott, in a footnote to his article, distinguishes two different ways in
which one might defend a pro-life view with an argument based on the ‘‘paradox of
the heap’’ [33]. The first is grounded in metaphysical or theological arguments. For
example, someone may believe in substance ontology and claim that after the
fertilization, all changes that an embryo undergoes are merely ‘‘accidental’’ as
opposed to ‘‘substantial.’’
The second is based on something like the ANU: a cautious response to
uncertainty about the moral status of the embryo. However, in describing this
argument, Elliott conflates uncertainty or moral fallibility with disagreement. He
says that ‘‘there is often significant disagreement about the strength of the premises
for these metaphysical or theological arguments,’’ and he maintains that for some
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pro-life thinkers, this disagreement is a reason for acting cautiously. It is true that
there is disagreement about the moment of ensoulment among theologians. But the
problem is that disagreement about moral issues among different scholars can exist
even if every party is completely certain about his or her moral views. The ANU in
my interpretation aims to be a model not only for decision-making under
disagreement, but also for decision-making under uncertainty by fallible agents
whose credences are divided between different moral doctrines (another short
discussion of an argument similar to the ANU can be found in [34]).
The critique of the ANU
Now, I will demonstrate that the pro-life view, even in my interpretation, which is
seemingly stronger than the standard one, has limited scope. It cannot be used to
restrict promising research on human embryos, but it does have some interesting
applications. I am going to focus on two problems, one general and one more
specific: the first concerns the possibility of adapting absolutist moral doctrines
to the decision theory framework; the second concerns intertheoretic value
comparisons.
In the third section of this article, I stated that the ANU makes use of the decision
theory model of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty. One could
claim that my description of the ANU is mistaken, because pro-life views are
usually based on a deontological ethical framework that treats right actions as a
matter of complying with rules and evaluates outcomes only in terms of the actions
that produced them. Therefore, one could argue that this framework does not fit the
decision theory framework which can be used only by consequentialist theories. But
this does not have to be the case. Ethical doctrines usually give clear recommen-
dations in situations where the results of actions and all morally relevant
information are known [35]. For example, they disagree on what to do in so-
called trolley cases: if you flip the switch, then you know one person will be killed
for sure, whereas if you do not flip it, then five other people will be killed. In these
kinds of cases, you are sure that they will be killed and you are certain that they are
persons. But what to do when there is no such certainty about the results or—as in
the case of embryo research—about the ontological status of some beings? Since
deontology, like every other normative doctrine, must deal with uncertainties, it can
be accommodated—as several authors have recently observed—‘‘in something like
the standard decision-theory framework, and thus expected utility theory need not
be thought of as a tool available only to the consequentialist’’ [36, p. 525].
Nevertheless, the decision theory model, when used to guide our action in moral
terms and within the deontological framework, is highly controversial. It assumes
that in the face of risk, we are rational if and only if we maximize expected value
(whatever it is). The ANU assumes a similar model for an agent who wants to act
morally in the face of uncertainty. When an agent wants to make morally correct
decisions, she must obey the same principles of rationality that she should obey in
any other kind of decisions. Therefore the ANU assumes a meta-moral obligation of
maximizing expected moral value: this is not only a requirement of rationality, but
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also a requirement of morality. If one wants to act morally in situations of normative
uncertainty, one should follow the rules of rationality as they are understood by the
decision theory model.
The main problem that the supporters of the ANU have to deal with consists in
making intertheoretic comparisons of values. Normally, when we use an expected
utility calculus, we use a common scale by which we can measure the values
attached to these different outcomes (this is one reason why so many examples refer
to money). But there does not seem to be anyway of making this kind of
intertheoretic comparison of moral values between different theories or doctrines.
The moral theories themselves cannot be a starting point since we need some meta-
theoretical tool to judge which action has the highest expected moral value
in situations where our credence is divided between different moral theories (or
between different views on the moral status of a human embryo).
Let me demonstrate this problem with the example of destructive embryo
research. The followers of the ANU try to argue that we are dealing, on the one
hand, with the doctrine that ascribes a very high value to the embryos and, on the
other, with theories that claim that destroying embryos does not matter from the
moral point of view (for example, because early embryos are like normal human
tissues). So, they argue, we should aim the safer course. Unfortunately for the pro-
life view this is not a proper description of the controversy. On the one hand, the
supporters of the pro-life view indeed claim that since it is possible that early
embryos have full moral status and no one can be sure that it is not so, everyone
should treat embryos as morally equal to adult human beings. But on the other hand,
the supporters of destructive human embryo research claim that embryo research
may help many future people, either living now or those who have not been born
yet—that it may lead to the development of therapies that lengthen lives, alleviate
suffering, and allow parents to achieve their reproductive goals. Fervent supporters
of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research write: ‘‘Failing to pursue this
research could result in thousands, perhaps millions, of avoidable deaths, not to
mention great pain and suffering’’ [37, p. 307]. Moreover, embryo research also
provides an opportunity to conduct basic research on the process of human
development. Therefore, according to the supporters of destructive human embryo
research, it would be extremely wrong to abandon this kind of research and the
option of abandoning research would have a very negative value.
How can we compare these two positions? How are we to ‘‘calculate’’ which
option has higher expected moral value? This is not an easy task because we have to
deal with at least two competing views which use different hierarchies of values. On
the one hand, if one of the pro-life views is correct, then embryo research is strictly
impermissible because embryos have full moral status. This is because they assign
either infinite or extremely high disvalue to intentionally killing an entity of full
moral status and only finite (or moderately high) disvalue to allowing people to die
(let us assume that these deaths could be avoided by the therapies resulting from
embryo research). This means that pro-lifers can agree that the expected benefits
from embryo research could be enormous, but not so large as to justify killing
entities with full moral status. On the other hand, if one of the pro-research views is
correct, abandoning embryo research is very wrong, because we are missing a
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chance to save thousands of future people and we do not sacrifice anything of great
moral significance by destroying human embryos in the process.
The proponents of the ANU would have to show, firstly, that their argument
works in situations in which we are dealing with at least two competing normative
views about the moral status of early embryos, and secondly, that abandoning
destructive human embryo research would indeed have higher expected moral value
than continuing this kind of research. I claim that the followers of the ANU do not
reach this second point: it is impossible to compare expected losses and benefits of
doing or abandoning embryo research from a point of view which is external to any
moral doctrine.
In recent literature, I have found one serious attempt to describe a tool that could
help in making intertheoretic comparisons of values. This is the ‘‘Principle of Equity
among Moral Theories’’ (PEMT), which claims that ‘‘the maximum degrees of
moral rightness of all possible actions in a situation according to competing moral
theories should be considered equal’’ [23, p. 84] (the same is said about ‘‘the
minimum degrees of moral rightness’’). Unfortunately, this idea seems to be
obviously mistaken because different moral views can strongly disagree about the
moral value of the same action: they can disagree about how wrong or how right an
action is. In the example discussed in this article, we are uncertain about which of
two views on experiments on early embryos is correct: the first says that destroying
embryos for research is strictly forbidden because they have as high a moral status
as adults; the second says that research on embryos is not forbidden, but morally
demanded, because the moral status of embryos is so low that the expected future
gains can easily override the disvalue of embryo destruction. The PEMT cannot
help to solve this dilemma because it would say that in this situation the worst
possible action according to the first normative view (destroying embryo for
research) should be considered equal to the worst possible action according to the
second view (abandoning embryo research). The problem is that in the first case, we
would do something gravely wrong (according to this normative doctrine): we
would be killing large numbers of beings that have moral status equal to the status
of adults to gain some uncertain future scientific benefits; therefore, we are
committing one of the most morally horrible acts. However, in the second case we
are doing something wrong, but probably not so gravely wrong within this
normative view (there are many much worse categories of actions than abandoning
destructive embryo research in this normative framework). Therefore, the PEMT is
not the tool we are looking for: it cannot help in comparing different values
according to different moral doctrines since it equalizes these values by definition
(for more objections, see [38]).
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the ANU type of reasoning works
perfectly well. Suppose, for example, that John must decide whether to kill some
living organism or not (this is a modified version of the example discussed by [24]).
John believes that it is highly probable that from the moral point of view it does not
matter if he kills this type of being or not, but he is not absolutely certain of his
normative views (let us assume that his degree of credence is 0.99). This means that
he thinks that there is a very small chance that killing this kind of organism is in fact
morally wrong (his degree of credence regarding this view is 0.01). Therefore, given
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the view that is the most probable in his opinion, it would be neutral from the moral
point of view to kill or not to kill this organism. But given the alternative view, it
would be morally wrong to kill this type of organism and morally good not to kill it.
If John wants to maximize the expected moral value of his decisions, he should
choose not to kill this organism, even though he believes that the probability that
killing this type of being is morally wrong is indeed extremely low. The application
of the ANU in this type of reasoning seems to be correct, because here there is no
problem with intertheoretic comparisons of values. John does not have to compare
any values or disvalues between different moral doctrines or views on the moral
status of this living organism, because one view says that everything he does in the
situation is morally neutral. In these types of cases, the ANU would indeed give one
a reason to prefer the ‘‘morally safer’’ option, only if the probability that this option
is morally correct is greater than zero (but see two recent critiques of this kind of
argumentation [39, 40]).
The above example has an interesting implication in the case of early embryo
protection: the ANU would in fact prohibit destroying early embryos in situations in
which there are no prospects for achieving anything of moral worth (e.g., destroy
them just ‘‘for fun’’). Nevertheless, the decision theory model of moral reasoning
in situations of normative uncertainty is a dangerous ally of the pro-life position. At
first, the ANU seems to help to defend pro-life views in the case of embryo research
because it promised to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of
embryos with the certainty about normative obligations, and was based on a
cautious response to the ambiguity about the ontological status of early human
embryos. However, the ANU does not withstand closer inspection, and it turns out
that the supposed ally of the pro-life position cannot be used to justify limiting
promising research on early embryos.
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